AfD Surges Ahead in Saxony-Anhalt
Recent polls place the Alternative for Germany (AfD) at 40-42% support in Saxony-Anhalt less than two weeks before the 6 September state election, roughly double its 2021 result and far ahead of the governing CDU on 22-23%. Lead candidate Ulrich Siegmund has framed an AfD win as the start of wider political change in Germany, promising to reorganise migration policy and redirect hundreds of millions of euros from asylum and NGO spending toward schools and hospitals. He has ruled out coalitions, aiming for single-party government.
Eastern Germany has seen sustained AfD strength amid voter disillusionment with established parties after years of CDU-led rule in the state. Parallel surveys show the party at around 43% across the former East excluding Berlin. The CDU under Premier Sven Schulze, in power for over two decades in various coalitions, trails badly. Left parties (Die Linke, SPD, Greens) remain fragmented in the low-to-mid teens or single digits. Other parties risk falling below the 5% threshold.
Even at these levels the AfD would likely fall short of an absolute majority. Other parties have ruled out cooperation, raising the prospect of a broad anti-AfD coalition that would sideline the largest vote share. This creates an open tension between electoral arithmetic and the cordon sanitaire. Questions remain over whether high undecided numbers (around 30% in some polls) will hold, how migration and economic grievances translate into turnout, and whether a strong AfD showing accelerates national realignment or entrenches institutional blocking tactics.
Sources: The European Conservative; supporting poll reports.
Russia-Europe Escalation: Retaliation, Not Invasion Bid
CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s recent Moscow visit, reportedly to warn against attacks on European neighbours, has intensified European concerns that Russia might test NATO with limited strikes amid the Ukraine stalemate. Hybrid incidents—drone incursions, suspected sabotage at munitions sites—are widely read in European capitals as probes of Alliance resolve.
Analyst Jennifer Kavanagh argues this misreads Russian drivers. Moscow views Europe as a direct combatant through funding, weapons and technology supplied to Ukraine, treating its own actions as tit-for-tat retaliation and cost-imposition rather than unprovoked aggression aimed at conquering territory. Examples include reciprocal vessel seizures and threats against British targets after UK drone and missile-technology support. Resource constraints (high Russian losses in Ukraine, fiscal strain) and residual uncertainty over US responses under Trump further reduce incentives for a full European war.
The core contradiction lies in threat perception: Europe sees probing aggression; Russia sees defensive pushback against a proxy campaign. This leaves open whether de-escalatory dialogue on red lines and mutual reassurance—separate from Ukraine talks—can interrupt the spiral, or whether continued European military support and hybrid exchanges will produce miscalculation. Ending the Ukraine conflict quickly remains the cleanest off-ramp, yet remains distant; pragmatic channels face political resistance in Europe as “rewarding” Moscow.
Sources: UnHerd.